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fer of wealth did not in itself
convert regulation into physical
invasion.
Because the Escondido rent control ordinance did not compel a
landowner to suffer the physical
occupation of his property, the
Court concluded that it did not
constitute a per se taking by the
government and compensation
was therefore not required.
Daniel Hynes

Second Circuit Finds That
New York Cable Downgrade
Fees Are Not Preempted By
Federal Cable Act
In Cable Television Association
of New York, Inc. v. William B.

Finneran, 954 F.2d 91 (2nd. Cir.
1992), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that a federal cable communication law does not preempt New
York regulations of cable television downgrade charges. The court
found that Congress intended to
preempt only state rules that regulate rates for the provision of cable
services, and downgrade charges
were not this type of rate within the
meaning of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 ("Cable
Act"), 47 U.S.C. 521 et seq. (1992).
Background
On December 3, 1990, in response to customer complaints
about $40 to $100 charges, the
New York State Commission on
Cable Television ("the Commission") adopted regulations limiting
cable television companies' imposition of downgrade charges. Since
consumers saved about $10 per
month by dropping to a lower level
of cable service, the high downgrade fees tended to remove any
incentive to switch to a lower tier
of service. In addition, the cable
companies' cost to downgrade service was either minimal, for newer
cable-ready television sets, or between $50 and $75, for older sets
requiring removal of a descrambler
box.
The Commission's regulations
define a downgrade charge as a fee
imposed on a subscriber for a
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change in service that results in a
less expensive tier of service. The
regulation did not prohibit downgrade charges entirely but limited
the fee to the companies' actual
downgrading cost if: the customer
had been given adequate notice;
and the existing service had not
been maintained for the previous
six months.
Downgrade charges were also
permitted in order to prevent
churning. Churning occurs when a
customer signs up for a premium
channel in order to watch a particular program, and soon after elects
to downgrade to a cheaper service
tier.
On December 26, 1990, the Cable Television Association of New
York, Inc. ("Association") filed
suit in the District Court for the
Northern District of New York,
seeking a declaration that the Cable Act of 1984 preempted the
Commission's downgrade regulations. The district court found that
the preemption provision of the
Cable Act did not apply to the
Commission's regulations. The Association appealed to the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Cable Act Does Not Preempt State
Regulation
The Second Circuit began by
examining whether Congress intended to preempt the entire field
of cable television regulation when
it passed the Cable Act of 1984.
After a comprehensive examination of the Cable Act's history, the
court of appeals noted that in
1984, the United States Supreme
Court gave the Federal Communication Commission ("FCC") discretion to preempt virtually any
state regulation of the cable industry. As a result of the Supreme
Court's decision, Congress passed
the Cable Act and thereby expressed its intent to create a comprehensive scheme for regulating
cable television.
Despite this broad ability to
preempt, previous case law had
held that in the Cable Act, Congress did not preempt state regulation of downgrade charges. The
court of appeals reasoned that if
the FCC had meant to reverse this
prior decision, it could have done
so while issuing interpretations of

the Cable Act. The FCC's failure to
do so strongly indicated that no
such preemptive intent existed.
The Association argued that
Congress must have intended to
preempt state regulation of downgrade charges since the Cable Act
effectively regulated other rates relating to the provision of cable
services. Although the court of
appeals agreed that state regulation
of downgrade charges had some
effect on the rates cable companies
charged for general cable services,
the court stated that to preempt
every cost-imposing state regulation would conflict with the Cable
Act's express authorization of state
regulation.
Lastly, the court of appeals addressed the Association's argument
that the regulations' impact on
cable provision rates was sufficiently large to force the conclusion
that Congress must have intended
to preempt state regulation of
downgrade charges. The court of
appeals found no such congressional intent for two reasons.
First, the Cable Act expressly
authorized state regulation in numerous fields that affected cable
company service rates, and states
were allowed to regulate charges
associated with the complete disconnection of service.
Second, the language of the preemption clause at issue failed to
evidence Congressional intent to
carve out a wide area free from
state regulation. The court held
that Congress meant to preempt
only state rules that regulated cable
rates relating to providing customers with service, not all cable charges generally.
Downgrade Charges Are Not
Rates
The Association also argued that
downgrade charges fell under the
definition of rates and accordingly
were within the express preemption provisions of the Cable Act.
The Association contended that a
customer is provided with service
when, in fact, cable access is being
downgraded because cable service
includes service of machinery that
is necessary to facilitate programming. The court of appeals disagreed, finding that although cable
(continued on page 130)
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service is not limited to cable programming, the Cable Act preempted only laws regarding the provision of cable services, not all cable
services generally.
Judy Koehler

Eighth Circuit Imposes Full
CERCLA Liability On Seller
Who Hid Contamination
From Purchaser
In Gopher Oil Company, Inc. v.
Union Oil Company of California,
955 F.2d 519 (8th Cir. 1992), the
United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit held that the
seller of a chemical plant site was
100 percent responsible for the
environmental cleanup costs incurred by the purchaser because
the seller caused the pollution and
misrepresented the condition of
the site when selling the property.
Background
A subsidiary of Union Oil Company of California ("Union") operated a petroleum product treatment facility on a five-acre site in
Minneapolis, Minnesota from the
early 1960's until 1980. The subsidiary's normal operating procedures resulted in leaks, spills, and
the dumping of oil and industrial
chemicals. When Union decided to
sell the property in 1980, it removed some of the contaminated
soil but covered other contaminated areas with landscaping gravel.
When Gopher Oil Company
("Gopher") expressed an interest
in purchasing the site, Union representatives told Gopher of two
previous chemical spills but did
not inform Gopher that past operating procedures caused continual
leaks and dumping on the site.
During the site inspection conducted by Gopher representatives,
some soil discoloration was visible,
but much of the contaminated
ground was hidden beneath the
gravel. Although Gopher had access to Union's records, it did not
examine them.
The president of Gopher con130

tacted the Minnesota Department
of Inspections and the Minnesota
Pollution Control Authority ("the
Authority"). The Authority told
Gopher about the two major chemical spills but had no information
about other pollution problems at
that site.
Gopher purchased the site from
Union in November, 1980. The
purchase agreement stated that the
land and facilities were transferred
in an "as is" condition and that
none of the warranties made in the
agreement misstated or omitted
any material facts. After the purchase, Gopher repaired the plant
and claims to have controlled and
cleaned up any leaks or spills.
Three years after the purchase,
the Authority ordered an investigation, which revealed that the site
still contained substantial pollution. Under a compliance agreement with the Authority, Gopher
spent $423,272.81 in cleanup
costs.
In January, 1988, Gopher sued
Union in the United States District
Court for the District of Minnesota, seeking damages for fraud and
recovery of its cleanup costs under
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act ("CERCLA"), 42
U.S.C. 9607, 9613 (1992), and the
Minnesota Environmental Response and Liability Act ("MERLA"), Minn. Stat. 115B.04,
115B.08 (1991).
Under CERCLA, a federal statute, the costs of cleaning up a
polluted site are allocated among
the responsible parties. If a party
pays more than its fair share, it can
sue other responsible parties for
the difference. CERCLA also authorizes the award of attorney fees
to the winning party in such an
action. MERLA provides for essentially the same actions under
Minnesota state law.
District Court Awards Full
Cleanup Costs
The jury found that Union had
made material misrepresentations
about the condition of the site in
order to induce Gopher to purchase it. The jury also found Union
100 percent responsible for the
cleanup costs imposed under CERCLA. The district court awarded

Gopher the amount of its past
cleanup costs, plus interest and
more than $500,000 in attorney
fees.
Under Minnesota law, out-ofpocket loss is the difference between the actual value of the property Gopher received and the purchase price Gopher paid for it, in
addition to any damages caused by
the fraud. The district court reasoned that the cleanup activities
would increase the value of the
property. Therefore, the district
court judge decided to determine
out-of-pocket damages by calculating the difference between the purchase price and the value of the
property after the cleanup. The
judge decided to wait until the site
was cleaned and revalued before
determining Gopher's out-ofpocket loss.
Union moved for a new trial
which the district court denied.
Union appealed to the Court of
Appeals for the Eight Circuit both
the denial of a new trial as well as
the judgment imposing CERCLA
liability and the award of attorney
fees. Gopher appealed the district
court's decision to defer calculation of the damages under the
fraud claim until after completion
of the cleanup.
Fraudulent Misrepresentation
Occurred
Union argued that the "as is"
clause in the purchase agreement
and Gopher's experience in the
industry conferred upon Gopher a
duty to investigate the property
before purchasing it. Therefore,
Gopher's evidence of fraud, which
consisted of testimony that Union
had assured Gopher the site was
pollution free, was not substantial
enough to support the jury's verdict. The appellate court upheld
the district court's decision because the evidence showed that
Union knew of the pollution and
had tried to conceal it from Gopher. Additionally, Gopher had
relied upon these misrepresentations when purchasing the property.
With regard to the common law
fraud claim, Union argued that no
law allows for recovery of attorney
fees in this type of common law
action. The court of appeals
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